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In an ongoing organization, such as a large law partnership ﬁrm, employees are
motivated not only by current rewards but also by the prospect of promotion,
and the opportunity to inﬂuence policy and make the rules in the future. This
leads to a dynamic programming problem in contract design.
We model career design in such a ﬁrm as a recursive mechanism design
problem in an overlapping generations environment. Agents entering the ﬁrm
may diﬀer in their private characteristics which aﬀect their costs of eﬀort. We
ﬁnd that under recursive structure, a proﬁt-maximizing principal oﬀers, and
promotion-motivated agents accept, “rat-race” contracts with very low wages
a n dh i g he ﬀort levels. With wages driven down to zero, promotions become the
main instrument to discriminate among agents in an adverse selection environ-
ment. The optimal adverse selection contract introduces a promotion barrier,
or a “glass ceiling”, for the high cost agents. We thus ﬁnd that the issues of
ineﬃciently high work levels (the “rat-race”) and of unequal promotion rates
(the “glass ceiling”) are intimately interconnected. We apply this framework to
equal opportunity and gender discrimination in employment.
Keywords recursive contracts, mechanism design, overlapping generations, rat-
race, glass ceiling.1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In an ongoing ﬁrm, employees are motivated not only by current rewards but
also by the prospect of promotion. Promotion to a senior position brings with
it the valuable opportunity to inﬂuence policy, and to make the rules in the
future. In particular, it may bring the right to set the terms under which the
next cohort of employees will work.
This process may be observed to some degree in many large organizations,
but it is particularly clear in ﬁrms that are organized as professional partner-
ships; for example law ﬁrms, accountancy partnerships and management con-
sultants. In these ﬁrms the career path leads towards ownership rights, and the
ability to make management decisions unrestricted by external owners.
In such a ﬁrm, the employment contract is recursive. The contract that will
be agreed today depends upon the prospects for promotion and the nature of
the contracts that will be agreed tomorrow. This structure leads to a dynamic
programming problem in contract design. Bardsley [3] has studied such a re-
cursive principal-agent problem in an overlapping generations ﬁrm, assuming
complete information and a homogeneous population. He found that the re-
cursive structure typically induces an ineﬃcient “rat-race,” with low wages and
high eﬀort levels.
In this paper we consider recursive contracts under adverse selection. Em-
ployees entering the ﬁrm have diﬀerent private characteristics that aﬀect the
cost, to the employee, of exerting a given level of eﬀort. We ﬁnd that the con-
tract imposed by the principal is characterised not only by a “rat-race,” with
low wages and very high eﬀort levels, but also by entry barriers and promotion
barriers. In order to induce high eﬀort levels from the top (low cost) type,
and to discourage them from imitating the bottom (high cost) type, the prin-
cipal will seek to extract all information rents from the bottom type. Since
wages are already low and eﬀort levels high, this is done by excluding the latter
from employment altogether, or by reducing the probability that they will be
promoted.
We use this framework to explore the implications of equal opportunity em-
ployment laws and conventions. Some employees (typically women) may have
a higher outside value of time due to child care costs and household production
opportunities1,o rs o m es o c i a lg r o u p sm a yh a v es u ﬀered educational disadvan-
tage. However the contract designer must remain blind to these characteristics.
This may be due to explicit legal requirements, or it may be due to the force of
social norms and conventions. We thus consider equal opportunity practice as
the suppression of information, leading to an adverse selection problem. Under
this adverse selection the recursive structure of the ongoing ﬁrm leads not only
to a “rat-race,” but also to entry barriers and a “glass ceiling.” We thus ﬁnd
that the issues of high work levels (the “rat-race”) and of unequal promotion
rates (the “glass ceiling”) are intimately interconnected. It should be empha-
sized that, although the outcome might be considered discriminatory, this “glass
1Wood, Corcoran and Courant [19] provide evidence of the high private costs incurred by
w o m e ni nal a r g el a wﬁrm.
1ceiling” eﬀect occurs without any overt discrimination. The contracts oﬀered
are completely neutral between types (in fact type is invisible to the principal
when the contract is oﬀered). Agents self select on the basis of their preferences.
Curiously, we ﬁnd that the suppression of information is welfare enhancing (at
least relative to the very severe rat-race that would ensue under full informa-
tion). However the beneﬁt accrues entirely to the top type, typically men. The
presence of the bottom type mitigates the severity of the “rat-race,” and the
t o pt y p ei sa b l et oe a r ns o m ei n f o r m a t i o nr e n t s .
The law ﬁrm is a natural laboratory in which to explore recursive contracts
in an overlapping generations environment, and this is the example that we will
have in mind. “Rat-races” and “glass ceilings” appear to be very prevalent in
such ﬁrms. These ﬁrms are typically organized as an ongoing partnership with
no outside equity. The characteristics of the large commercial law ﬁrm have been
well documented in a number of studies, for example Carr and Matthewson [6],
Feinberg [8], Ferrall [9], Galanter and Palay [11], Gilson and Mnookin [12],
Landers Rebitzer and Taylor [14], O’Flaherty and Siow [15], and Spurr [18]. In
the traditional law partnership the partners own the ﬁrm in equal shares and
they face soft incentives (for example equal proﬁt shares and permanent tenure).
Associates in these ﬁrms face much harsher incentives, with an “up or out”
career path. They earn a relatively low wage (compared with a partner’s proﬁt
share), and they are subject to work pressures that appear to be ineﬃciently
high (Ferrall [9], Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor [14]; see also Akerlof [1]).
Traditionally, major law ﬁrms were an exclusively male preserve. The pro-
portion of women associates has grown rapidly in recent years; however a glass
ceiling seems to operate, and far fewer reach partnership (Spurr [18], Wood,
Corcoran and Courant [19]). The issues of excessively high eﬀort levels and of
barriers to the promotion of women are very relevant in these ﬁrms (Albrecht,
Björklund and Vroman [2], Blau and Kahn [5], Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor
[14], Spurr [18]).
Staughton and Talmor [17] have recently considered managerial compensa-
tion as a mechanism design problem, but not in a recursive context. Sicherman
and Galor [16] model career mobility with an explicit consideration of internal
as well as external promotion opportunities. Several recent studies model the
law ﬁrm as an overlapping generations structure, but not from a contract design
perspective (see also Cremer[7]). Ferrall [9] considers a moral hazard problem,
with a tournament model of promotions. Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor [14]
present an interesting adverse selection model, where the selection pressure is
driven by free riding between partners. We will discuss the relationship of our
model with their work in more detail below.
From a theoretical perspective, the recursive mechanism design problem ap-
pears to be signiﬁcantly more diﬃcult than the standard non-recursive problem.
The reason is that the incentive compatibility constraints interact quite strongly
with the recursive structure of the model, making many standard arguments in-
applicable. To solve the problem, we introduce a regularity assumption on the
2technology which is stronger than the standard single crossing property.2 In our
view, the analysis of recursive adverse selection contracts presents an interesting
addition to the mechanism design literature.
The structure of the paper is as follows. The basic model is set out in Section
2, and its properties are analyzed in Section 3. The optimal contract for the
two-type case is derived in Section 4. In Section 5 we illustrate the ﬁndings with
a numerical example and apply the model to explore the issue of discrimination
and glass ceilings.
2 The Model
Consider a pure adverse selection model with no moral hazard involved. There
are a ﬁnite number I of types of agents in the economy. The agent’s type θi,
1 ≤ i ≤ I, aﬀects his cost of eﬀort, as will be deﬁned below. There are a
ﬁnite number ni of agents of type θi born each period, and each agent lives for
two periods. The agent’s type is private information. The set of types and the
number of agents of each type is common knowledge; the total number of agents
born each year is n =
P
i ni.
There is a single ﬁrm, owned in each period by a single principal. If hired
by the ﬁrm, the agents get involved in a production activity which is costly for
them. An agent of type θi who produces an output b ∈ R+ exerts an eﬀort
ei ∈ R+, which is a deterministic function of the output level and the agent’s
type: ei = e(b,θi). We assume that the eﬀort is decreasing in type: if θi < θj,
then e(b,θi) >e (b,θj) for all b>0. Each agent’s output is ex-post observable,
but the eﬀort is not.
An agent of type θi who is born at date t,i so ﬀered, with probability σi,t,
an employment contract (wi,t,πi,t,b i,t) with the ﬁrm. This contract speciﬁes
aw a g ewi,t, a promotion probability πi,t, and an output level bi,t. Promotion
probability πi,t is the probability, conditional upon having been hired in the
ﬁrst place, that the agent will be the principal in the next period. The contract
(σi,t,b i,t,w i,t,πi,t) thus sets out how many agents of each type are hired, what
they do, what they are paid, and who is promoted. The contract will be required
to satisfy incentive compatibility constraints to induce truthful revelation. Un-
employed agents, and agents who reject the contract, receive a reservation utility
of 0 in both periods. Agents who are not promoted leave the ﬁrm and receive
0 in the second period. The agent who is promoted to become the principal in
the second period exerts no eﬀort and enjoys the ﬁrm’s current proﬁts net of
the wages paid to the employees. We assume that the agent utility is separable
between periods and there is no discounting; all agents are risk neutral.
For simplicity, we consider only time-stationary contracts. Thus the sub-
script t can be dropped. Bardsley [3] discusses both stationary and non-stationary
recursive contracts in a complete information environment. He also discusses
the eﬀect of risk aversion and of congestible supervisory eﬀort by the principals.
2See, e.g., Fudenberg and Tirole [10], page 259, on the single crossing, or sorting, conditions.
3Here we assume stationarity, risk neutrality and an inactive principal in the in-
terest of tractability, and in order to focus more clearly on the eﬀect of adverse
selection.
It is straight forward to re-interpret this as a model of a multi-principal
partnership ﬁrm under the assumption that the partners exert no eﬀort, and
they share the partnership proﬁts equally (for details, see Bardsley [3]). Thus,
although they may be of diﬀerent types, the multiple principals have no diﬃculty
in agreeing on the objectives of the ﬁrm. We will not explore this interpretation
any further here, and henceforth we will retain the assumption that the number
of “partners” is 1.
Given the assumption of risk-neutrality and no discounting between periods,
at y p eθi agent’s ex-ante (before employment contract is oﬀered) expected utility
from employment at the ﬁrm is his wage net of the cost of eﬀort, plus the
expected payoﬀ W from becoming the principal in the next period, times the
probability of being hired in the ﬁrst place:
U(σi,w i,πi,b i,W;θi)=σi (wi + πiW − e(bi,θi))
Since the principal is not directly involved in production, his objective is
simply to maximize his own current payoﬀ W,w h i c hi st h eﬁrm’s total output
less the wages paid to the agents. An optimal contract maximizes the payoﬀ
to the principal subject to individual rationality and incentive compatibility
constraints. The design problem is thus as follows.




niσi (bi − wi) (1a)
σi (wi + πiW − e(bi,θi)) ≥ 0 (1b)
σi (wi + πiW − e(bi,θi)) ≥ σj (wj + πjW − e(bj,θi)) (1c)
bi ≥ 0 (1d)
wi ≥ 0 (1e)
0 ≤ πi ≤ 1 (1f)
0 ≤ σi ≤ 1 (1g)
X
i
niπiσi =1 . (1h)
In the above, (1a) is the budget constraint, (1b) and (1c) are the individual
rationality and incentive compatibility constraints, respectively, (1d-1g) are fea-
sibility constraints, and (1h) is the stationarity constraint.3 For convenience we
will sometimes write IRi to refer to the individual rationality constraint (1b),
3Due to recursive nature of the problem, and, speciﬁc a l l y ,t h ep r e s e n c eo fs t a t i o n a r i t y
constraint (1h), the standard argument of “no random contracts” (see, e.g., Laﬀont and
Tirole [13], pages 119-120) does not apply here. Hence we explicitly incorporate employment
probabilities into the model.
4and ICij to refer to the incentive compatibility constraint (1c) .A s d e ﬁned
above, n =
P
ni is the population size; let ¯ n =
P
σini denote the size of the
ﬁrm, net of the principal.
We make the following assumptions about the population size and the tech-
nology.
Assumption 1 (no rare types) ni > 1 for all i.
Assumption 2 (convexity of eﬀort) The eﬀort function is continuously dif-
ferentiable at least twice, and
e(0,θ)=0 (2a)
eb (b,θ) > 0 (2b)
ebb (b,θ) > 0 (2c)
e(b,θ)
b
→∞ (as b →∞ ) (2d)
Assumption 3 (sorting conditions) If θi < θj and b>0, then
eb (b,θi) >e b (b,θj) (3a)








Assumption 4 (productive types) All types are potentially productive, where
we say that a type θ is potentially productive if e(b,θ) <bfor some b>0.
Equation (3a) is the usual single crossing condition, which says that mar-
ginal eﬀort is declining in type, while (3b) says that the convexity of the eﬀort
curve (which may be loosely interpreted as aversion to output uncertainty) is
also declining in type. If we write γ (b,θi,θj)=e(b,θi) − e(b,θj) for the cost
advantage of type j over type i in performing task b, then our assumptions
imply that this quantity is positive, strictly increasing and convex in b (we
do not impose strict convexity). While the above assumptions are standard
in the adverse selection literature, (3c) is an additional assumption we impose
to solve the recursive model.4 Equation (3c) may be interpreted to say that
although γ (b,θi,θj) increases in b it does not grow too quickly; in fact, less
quickly than e(b,θi)−b. This assumption will be used below in proving Lemma
8 (Appendix A). For convenience we will write SC, SC0 and SC00 for the sorting
conditions (3a) to (3c). These sorting conditions hold for a range of plausible




4Although assumption (3c) is not a necessary condition, we are unable to report on the con-
tractual structures that may arise in the absence of this assumption. Finding a necessary and
suﬃcient condition on the technology that would guarantee “sensible" solutions constitutes
an interesting challenge for further research.
5It may be helpful at this stage to compare this framework with the adverse
selection model of Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor [14], which is quite diﬀerent
in structure. Their model is driven by free riding under equal sharing between
partners, and high eﬀort levels are imposed at the entry level to screen for good
quality potential partners. They describe equilibrium contracts in which the
control parameters are the wage and the eﬀort level; promotion probabilities
are held ﬁxed, and are in fact set equal to 1. I nc o n t r a s t ,w ei g n o r ef r e er i d i n g
by partners, and focus instead on the dynamic ineﬃciencies that can arise under
recursive contracting. We are interested in the way that the multiple job design
instruments are combined, and we look for optimal contracts (assuming that
there is a single ﬁrm with monopoly power in contract design) in which hiring
probabilities, wages, eﬀort levels and promotion probabilities are all set ﬂexi-
bly. It is interesting to note that, in contrast to Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor,
we ﬁnd that wages in fact play no role in the optimal contract, and that the
compensation of agents for their eﬀort occurs entirely through the promotion
probability π (a conclusion that seems to be consistent with the stylized facts;
see for example Galanter and Palay [11]). It is also interesting that both mod-
els, although so diﬀerent in structure and assumptions, predict ineﬃciently high
eﬀort levels.
3 Basic Properties
We now turn to establishing some basic properties of the model. The approach
that we will take is somewhat more roundabout than the way one would ap-
proach the standard adverse selection agency problem. The reason is that the
recursive structure, which is here embedded in the stationarity constraint (1h),
interacts with the incentive compatibility constraints. Consider for example the
familiar proposition that all rent is extracted from the bottom agents. In the
standard (non-recursive) model, the principal can simply reduce the wages of
all types by a constant amount until this is so, and this will not upset any
incentive compatibility constraints. In our model, it may happen that some
wage is zero; in fact we will ﬁnd that in the optimal contract all wages are
zero. So it may be that the principal can only extract rent from an agent by
increasing eﬀort levels or by reducing the promotion probability. Either action
may upset incentive compatibility. An increase in eﬀort ﬂows back to all agents
as an increase in expected reward in the second period, but the distribution of
this beneﬁt is uneven, depending on promotion probabilities. And a change in
promotion probabilities requires a complicated rebalancing of other elements of
the contract, since equation (1h) imposes a sort of “balanced budget” condition
in probabilities. We do in the end (in Section 4) show that all rent is extracted
at the bottom, but it is not immediate, and we will need the non-standard
condition (3c).
Lemma 1 In an optimal contract W>0. That is, under an optimal contract,
the principal’s payoﬀ is strictly positive.
6Proof. Let θ1 be the lowest type, and choose b1 such that e(b1,θ1) <b 1.
Consider the pooling contract under which all types are employed with certainty
(σi =1 ), all are paid the wage wi = e(b1,θ1) and required to produce b1, and
all are promoted with probability πi = 1
n. This contract is incentive compatible
and individually rational, and it gives to the principal a strictly positive payoﬀ.
An optimal contract can only do better.
Lemma 2 The budget constraint (1a) binds. That is, all surplus is distributed.




i niσiwi − W be the budget surplus. As-
sume that B>0. We will show that the principal can capture, in an incentive
compatible way, a strictly positive part of this surplus.
For convenience we will make the temporary assumption that all types are
employed, σi > 0 for all i, giving any agents of type θj for whom σj =0an
equivalent null contract: σj =1 ,b j =0 , πj =0 ,w j =0 , under which they are
employed with certainty. This assumption will allow us to treat employed and
unemployed types together, rather than by separate arguments.
We will construct a new contract, where we increase W by δW>0 and we
increase wi by δwi ≥ 0, all other variables being kept ﬁxed.
So choose δB such that 0 < δB ≤ B, and choose δW such that 0 < δW<
σiwi+ δB
n
σiπi for all i such that σiπi 6=0 . T h i sc a nb ed o n e ,s i n c et h e r ea r eo n l ya
ﬁnite number of types. We set δwi = δB
σin − πiδW.
F i r s tw en o t et h a tσi (wi + δwi)=σiwi + δB
n −σiπiδW ≥ 0 b yt h ec h o i c eo f
δW, so the new contract pays a non-negative wage to all types. Next we note
t h a tt h ec h a n g ei nt h ee x - a n t er e t u r nt ot y p ei is σiδwi +σiπiδW = δB
n , which
is strictly positive and the same for all types. So the incentive compatibility
and individual rationality constraints are not violated. Finally we note that the
sum of the extra payments to the principal and all agents is δW +
P
niσiδwi =
δB ≤ B, so the budget constraint is not violated. Thus the original contract
could not have been optimal.
Remark 1 For an unemployed type (σi =0 ), the variables wi, πi and bi can
be chosen arbitrarily. We will now impose the convention that if σi =0then
wi = πi = bi =0(unemployed types are oﬀe r e dan u l lc o n t r a c t ) .
Lemma 3 Let i0 b et h el o w e s tt y p es u c ht h a tσi0 > 0 (this is the lowest type that
is oﬀered an employment contract). If i>i 0 then σi > 0, and the individual
rationality constraint IRi is slack. That is, employment is sequential in type
and the IR constraints do not bind, except perhaps at the bottom.
Proof. The argument is standard. Applying the incentive constraint ICii0
and the assumption that the eﬀort is decreasing in type, we obtain:
σi (wi + πiW − e(bi,θi)) ≥ σi0 (wi0 + πi0W − e(bi0,θi))
= σi0 (wi0 + πi0W − e(bi0,θi0)) + σi0 (e(bi0,θi0) − e(bi0,θi))
> 0.
7It is convenient to rewrite the constraints, eliminating the variables πi and
replacing them with a new variable ρi = wi +πiW, w h i c hi st h ea g e n t ’ si n t e r i m
expected payoﬀ conditional on being employed. Making this substitution we
obtain an equivalent problem P0.











σiρi − σie(bi,θi) ≥ 0 (4c)
σiρi − σie(bi,θi) ≥ σjρj − σje(bj,θi) (4d)
wi ≥ 0 (4e)
0 ≤ ρi − wi ≤ W (4f)
0 ≤ σi ≤ 1 (4g)
bi ≥ 0. (4h)
By Lemma 2, the modiﬁe db u d g e tc o n s t r a i n te q u a t i o n(4b) could now be
i m p o s e da sa ne q u a l i t y .W ec h o o s en o tt od os oa tt h i ss t a g e ,i no r d e rt os i g n
some Kuhn Tucker multipliers below.
Theorem 1 If σi > 0 then πi =1or wi =0 . If σi =1then πi < 1 and wi =0 .
That is, all employed agents are paid zero wage except, possibly, those who are
promoted with certainty.
Proof. Assume that σi > 0, and that wi > 0 and πi < 1 (that is to say,
ρi − wi <W ). Consider reducing wi a little without violating either of these
constraints, keeping bi, ρi, σi and wj,j6= i, ﬁxed (this is possible since πi < 1).
Then wi does not occur in the three inequality constraints (4b, 4c, 4d), and by
assumption the constraints (4e, 4f) are not binding. But by (4a) the objective
W will increase. Thus either wi =0or πi =1 .




niσi (ρi − wi)
≥ niσi (ρi − wi)
= niπiW.
Thus niπi =1 ;but by Assumption 1, ni > 1. So πi < 1. Hence, from above,
wi =0 .
We interpret this Theorem to say that, provided it is feasible to do so, wages
will always be driven down to the reservation level of zero. The intuition is
that the current principal prefers to extract any surplus now, and to defer any
8payment to the agents until a future period. The agents do not mind, since they
are risk neutral and do not discount the future. The next principal is no worse
oﬀ, since the liability may be moved forward yet again. Bardsley [3] explores
this mechanism in some detail, ﬁnding that it is always feasible to drive the wage
to zero provided that the expected future earnings of the ﬁrm are suﬃcient to
compensate agents for their current eﬀort5. We will see below that, in the model
that we study here, wages will always be driven to zero.
Remark 2 The proof of Theorem 1 shows that whenever wi > 0 and πi < 1 the
principal can reduce wi and increase his payoﬀ.A sh ed o e ss o ,πi will rise. The
process stops when either wi =0or πi =1 . Recall also (Lemma 2) that if the
budget constraint does not bind then the principal can redesign the contract to
share some or all of the surplus with the agents through an increase in W and
in the wage wi.I fπi < 1 for all types then these steps can be combined: some
of the budget surplus can be redistributed, and then the whole of the transfer
to the agents can be extracted by the principal using the technique of Theorem
1. This can go on until the condition πi < 1 is violated for some type. We
summarize by saying that if πi < 1 for all types then the principal can, at the
margin, appropriate all of the budget surplus. This observation will be useful
below, in the proof of Lemma 8 (Appendix A).
Lemma 4 There exists a type i such that σi =1 .T h a ti s ,t h e r ei sa tl e a s to n e
type of agents who are all employed.
Proof. Assume that σi < 1 for all i. Thus there exists k>1 such that
˜ σi = kσi < 1. If all the σi are replaced by ˜ σi then none of the constraints (4b) to
(4h) are violated but the return to the principal will increase by (k − 1)W>0.
Thus σi =1for some i.
Corollary 1 The number of agents employed is strictly greater than the number
of principals: ¯ n>1. Hence not every agent is promoted.
Proof. It follows from the preceding Lemma and from Assumption 1 that
¯ n =
P
i σini > 1.
Thus from Theorem 1 we have
wi =m a x( ρi − W, 0) (5)






(ρi − wi)=m i n( ρi,W) (7)
We can now use these relations to eliminate the wages wi, reformulating the
problem a third and ﬁnal time.
5Thus, for example, wages are driven to zero in a ﬁnite horizon version of the model,
except in the last few periods before the terminal date. Bardsley also ﬁnds that the zero wage
result holds up under moderate degrees of risk aversion, discounting and uncertainty about
the future earnings of the ﬁrm.











σiρi − σie(bi,θi) ≥ 0 (8c)
σiρi − σie(bi,θi) ≥ σjρj − σje(bj,θi) (8d)
0 ≤ σi ≤ 1 (8e)
bi ≥ 0 (8f)
ρi ≥ 0 (8g)
The principal’s return W is now deﬁned implicitly by (8a). This equation
makes very explicit the recursive nature of the problem. To check that W is
well deﬁned, consider the function Γ(W)=
P
i niσi min(ρi,W), holding ﬁxed
the parameters σi, ρi. It is easy to verify that Γ is concave, that Γ(0) = 0, that
Γ(W) is bounded, and that Γ0 (0) =
P
i niσi =¯ n>1. Thus there is a unique
positive solution to (8a).
4T h e T w o T y p e C a s e
We now specialize to the two type case. We ﬁrst verify that basic properties of
the standard non-recursive model still hold in our framework.
Theorem 2 Assume that there are two types θ1, and θ2. Then
1. The individual rationality constraint IR1 binds;
2. The individual rationality constraint IR2 is slack unless the lower type is
unemployed (σ1 =0 );
3. The incentive compatibility constraint IC12 is slack; and
4. The incentive compatibility constraint IC21 binds.
Curiously, the above properties, which are well-established in a non-recursive
adverse selection framework, are quite diﬃcult to obtain in our case; the proof
is given in Appendix A. It is at this stage that we need the non-standard sorting
assumption (3c) (see proof of Lemma 8 in Appendix A).
We now compute the optimal contract. We start with the complete infor-
mation case as a benchmark, and then move to the hidden types case.
4.1 Complete Information Contract
In the complete information environment the contract is not constrained by
incentive compatibility, so the IC constraints (8d) can be dropped. It is easy to
10check that the individual rationality constraints (8c) now bind, for otherwise the
agents could be required to work harder. Using these constraints to eliminate
the variables ρi, the design problem is to maximize W subject to the constraints
n1σ1 min(e(b1,θ1),W)+n2σ2 min(e(b2,θ2),W)=W (9a)
n1σ1 (b1 − e(b1,θ1)) + n2σ2 (b2 − e(b2,θ2)) ≥ 0 (9b)
0 ≤ σi ≤ 1 (9c)
bi ≥ 0. (9d)
Theorem 3 Under complete information, the optimal contract is characterized
by the following properties6
1.F u l le m p l o y m e n t :σ1 = σ2 =1 ;
2. Zero wages: w1 = w2 =0 ;
3. Dissipation of all surplus (the rat-race condition): n1e(b1,θ1)+n2e(b2,θ2)=
n1b1 + n2b2;
4. Equality of marginal eﬀort: eb (b1,θ1)=eb (b2,θ2);
5. High marginal eﬀort: eb (bi,θi) > 1, for i =1 ,2;
6. Output is monotonic in type: b2 >b 1.
Proof. The full employment result (1) follows from Lemma 9 in Appendix B.
Next, since σi =1it follows from Theorem 1 that wi =0(and also that
πi < 1 and ρi <W ), for i =1 ,2. T h i sd e m o n s t r a t e s( 2). Result (3)i sj u s ta
restatement of the fact that the budget constraint (9b) binds (Lemma 2).
Further, using the fact that ρi <W(and that σi =1 )f o ra l li,w es e et h a t
W = n1e(b1,θ1)+n2e(b2,θ2). The Lagrangean can now be written
L = n1e(b1,θ1)+n2e(b2,θ2)
+ α(n1b1 + n2b2 − n1e(b1,θ1) − n2e(b2,θ2)),
with α ≥ 0. Thus we have the ﬁrst order conditions
α +( 1− α)eb (b1,θ1) ≤ 0
α +( 1− α)eb (b2,θ2) ≤ 0.
If α =0then we would have b1 = b2 =0 , and hence W =0in contradiction
to Lemma 1. It is then also clear that α 6=1 . Thus the ﬁrst order conditions
hold with equality and we can eliminate the parameter α to show eb (b1,θ1)=
eb (b2,θ2); this is result (4).
6The theorem fully applies to a model with an arbitrary number of types, 1 ≤ I<∞.
The results are stated for the two-type case for an easier comparison with the incomplete





Figure 1: The full information contract.
Eﬀort curves e(b,θ1),e(b,θ2), and the 45◦
line are shown.
Let η = eb (b1,θ1)=eb (b2,θ2) be the common slope of the eﬀort curves at
the two contract points. If η ≤ 1 then, by the convexity of eﬀort assumption
(2c) the contract points would both lie strictly below the 45◦ line: b1 >e (b1,θ1)
and b2 >e (b2,θ2); this would contradict result (3) above. Thus η > 1, which
establishes result (5). Output monotonicity result (6) then follows from the
single crossing assumption (3a).
The complete information contract is illustrated in Figure 1. Condition (3)
of the above theorem tells us that the weighted average of the contract points
(b1,e(b1,θ1)) and (b2,e(b2,θ2)) lies on the 45◦ line (if n1 = n2 then the weighted
average is the midpoint; it always lies on the interval between the two contract
points). Optimality requires that the weighted mean lie as high on the 45◦ line
as is feasible; this is ensured by the marginal condition (4).
The ﬁgure also demonstrates that under complete information both types of






















= η. If η i ss m a l lt h e nb o t ho ft h e s ep o i n t s
lie below the 45◦ line, and so does their midpoint7.I f η is large then both of
these points lie above the 45◦ line, and so does their midpoint. By continuity,
t h e r ei sa ni n t e r m e d i a t ev a l u eo fη for which the midpoint lies exactly on the
45◦ line. This is the optimal contract.
7For simplicity of exposition we assume that n1 = n2 so that the weighted average contract
is the midpoint.
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π = e(b,q )/W
b
π = e(b,q )/W
Figure 2: Non-monotonic promotion under
full information. Contracts equalize marginal
eﬀort on three diﬀerent eﬀort curves.
Condition (5) of the theorem states that the marginal eﬀort exceeds the
marginal output for all types of agents; the optimal contract is thus ineﬃcient
and imposes overwork on all agent types.8 In fact, as the “rat-race" condition
(3) clearly demonstrates, all social surplus is dissipated.
Output monotonicity is a consequence of equality of marginal eﬀorts and
the single crossing assumption (3a). Note, however, that output monotonicity
does not necessarily imply reward (promotion probability) monotonicity. Under
the optimal contract promotion probabilities are increasing in eﬀort, hence all
depends on the shape of the eﬀort curve. Figure 2 illustrates. This has the
consequence that, in this model, low ability types may be promoted more often
than high ability types. Since principals do nothing, except design the contract
and absorb the surplus, there is no productivity reason to promote high types
(in contrast to Landers, Rebitzer and Taylor [14]). There may be good reasons
to do otherwise, in order to induce high eﬀort levels from high cost types. One
can show that promotion probability is increasing in type provided that the
eﬀort function meets the following regularity assumption: eθ (b,θ)ebb (b,θ) ≥
eb (b,θ)ebθ (b,θ). This assumption is satisﬁed for many reasonable speciﬁcations
8We use ex-ante Pareto eﬃciency criterion to evaluate the contract eﬃciency. A contract
is eﬃcient if no generation of agents can be made better oﬀ without reducing the welfare of
another generation, and no agent within a generation can be made better oﬀ without hurting
someone else. Since the current principal’s utility is already accounted for as the utility of one
of the agents in the previous generation, only the utilities of agents (potential employees) enter
the eﬃciency criterion. Under the optimal stationary contract described above, all individual
rationality constraints bind, and hence the ex-ante utility of every generation of agents is
zero. It is easy to show that there exists a feasible contract that yields to every generation a
positive utility (consider, for example, a pooling contract described in the proof of lemma 1);
the ineﬃciency follows. See Bardsley [3] for a detailed treatment of ineﬃciency of the “rat-
race" recursive contracts in the homogeneous agents world. The argument fully extends to
t h em u l t i p l et y p es e t t i n g .
13of the eﬀort function, including for example e(b,θ)=b2
θ and e(b,θ)=b
θ + b2.
4.2 Optimal Contract under Adverse Selection








γ (b) ≡ e(b,θ1) − e(b,θ2)
is type θ2 cost advantage over type θ1 in producing output b. W en o t et h a t ,
by assumptions (3a) and (3b), γ(b) is positive for b>0, increasing and convex.
Hence, the virtual eﬀort functions ε1 (b), ε2 (b) a r ep o s i t i v ef o rb>0,i n c r e a s i n g
and convex as well.
Theorem 4 The optimal contract is characterized by the following properties
1.S e q u e n t i a le m p l o y m e n t :σ2 =1 , but σ1 =1or σ1 =0 ;
2 .T h es i z eo ft h eﬁr mm a yb ee n d o g e n o u s l yb o u n d e d ;
3. Zero wages: w1 = w2 =0 ;
4. Dissipation of all virtual surplus: n1ε1 (b1)+n2ε2 (b2)=n1b1 + n2b2;
5. Equality of marginal virtual eﬀort: ε0
1 (b1)=ε0
2 (b2) > 1;
6. High marginal eﬀo r ta tt h et o p :eb (b2,θ2)=ε0
2 (b2) > 1;
7. Output is monotonic in type: b2 >b 1;
8. Positive information rents at the top, while all rents are extracted at the
bottom. All information rents are in the form of increased promotion
prospects.
Proof. The sequential employment result (1) is established in Appendix C
(lemmas 10 and 11). Now consider the Problem (P00).T h e IR2 and IC12
constraints can be dropped (because they are either redundant (if σ1 =0 )o r
slack (if σ1 > 0), while the IR1 and IC21 constraints bind. We can use these
binding constraints to get rid of ρi’s (as in the proof of lemma 11, Appendix C).
Further, using the fact that σ2 =1 , and σ1 =1or σ1 =0 , and writing the
model in terms of virtual eﬀort rather than actual eﬀort we have: Maximize W
subject to
n1σ1ε1 (b1)+n2ε2 (b2)=W







Figure 3: Possible non-existence of a full
employment contract under adverse selection.
The eﬀort curves e(b,θ1),e(b,θ2), the virtual
eﬀort ε(b.θ1) (dashed), and the 45◦ line are
shown
We notice that this is almost exactly like the complete information model
speciﬁed by constraints (9a)-(9d), with the result that σ2 =1 , σ1 ∈ {0,1}
incorporated, and with virtual eﬀort in place of actual eﬀort. Now the virtual
eﬀort functions satisfy all of the Assumptions 2 and 3 made of the eﬀort curves,
with the possible exception of Assumption 3c (which is irrelevant here), and
Assumption 4 (Productive Types). When we measure productivity in terms
of virtual eﬀort we cannot guarantee that type θ1 is potentially productive,
because the virtual eﬀort curve may lie entirely above the 45◦ line (see Figure
3). Thus Assumption 4 may fail for type θ1, leading to σ1 =0in an optimal
contract. The example in Section 5.1 below shows that either σ1 =1or σ1 =0
can occur. Thus information eﬀects may bound the size of the ﬁrm, and types
are employed sequentially from the top down. This demonstrates (2).
The proofs of (3) to (7) a r ee x a c t l yt h es a m ea st h ep r o o fo fT h e o r e m3 ,p a r t s
(2) to (6), using the virtual eﬀort curves rather than the actual eﬀort curves.
Part (8) follows from parts (1) and (2) of Theorem 2, and from result (3).
The optimal contract is illustrated in Figure 3. Under adverse selection high
type agents are hired before low type agents, and low type agents may not
be hired at all, even though they are potentially productive. This is because
hiring type θ1 agents means that information rents must be paid to type θ2
agents. Thus information eﬀects may endogenously limit the size of the ﬁrm.
It is interesting to note that there is a discrete jump in the hiring behavior.
15If even one low type agent is hired then information rents must be paid to all
higher agents, so if you hire one you might as well hire them all. It is clear from
Figure 3 why there may be no full employment contract that meets the ﬁrst
order conditions. If the virtual eﬀort curve ε1 (b1) lies above the 45◦ line, and if
the contract points (b1,ε1 (b1)) and (b2,ε2 (b2)) are chosen to equalize marginal
virtual cost, then it is possible that the weighted average of the contract points
will lie always above the 45◦ line, which would violate the budget constraint.
It is also clear why eb (b2,θ2) > 1. For assume that eb (b2,θ2) ≤ 1. If both
types are employed then the contract point (b1,ε1 (b1)) must lie at a point on the
virtual eﬀort curve where ε0
1 (b1)=ε0
2 (b2)=eb (b2,θ2) ≤ 1. But by convexity,
marginal virtual eﬀort exceeds average virtual eﬀort, so
ε1(b1)
b1 < 1. Thus the
contract point must lie below the 45◦ line. This is impossible, by the same
argument as in the complete information case. If only type θ2 is employed then
the contract point (b2,ε2 (b2)) must lie where the eﬀort curve intersects the 45◦
line, and it is clear then that eb (b2,θ2)=ε0
2 (b2) > 1.
It remains true, even in the incomplete information case, that although out-
put must be increasing in type it is possible that the promotion probability is
not increasing in type. However the virtual eﬀort curve ε0
1 (b1) is steeper than
the actual eﬀort curve e(b1,θ1), so under adverse selection it is more likely
that high types will be promoted more often. The reason is that under com-
plete information the reward (promotion probability) need only compensate for
costs, and cost may decline with type even though output increases. But in the
adverse selection case the high type also earns information rents, so it is more
likely that the reward increases with type.
5 R a tR a c e sa n dG l a s sC e i l i n g s
We have seen that in an overlapping generations ﬁrm with recursive contracts
the principal will impose a “rat-race” contract. Wages are driven down to the
reservation level of zero (see Theorem 1 and the following discussion). Eﬀort will
be driven up to ineﬃciently high levels; if there are no information constraints
eﬀort will be driven up to the point where the surplus is entirely dissipated
(Theorems 3 and 4). As in most principal-agent models, all rent is extracted
from the bottom. Since wages are already zero and eﬀort is high, this can only
be done by reducing the promotion probability of the bottom type (a “glass ceil-
ing”). Thus “rat-race” and “glass ceiling” eﬀects are intimately interconnected.
In order to sustain very high eﬀort levels at the top, the bottom type is driven
to the participation margin by low promotion rates.
165.1 Example
We illustrate these features of the optimal contract with a numerical example.
Let the eﬀort functions be
e(b,θ1)=τb + b2
e(b,θ2)=b2
where 0 < τ < 1. Let µ = n1
n1+n2 be the proportion of type θ1 agents in the
population.
It is straight forward to calculate that if µ<τ
2 then only the top type is
employed (σ1 =0 , σ2 =1 ), and the top type receives a pure rat-race contract
that extracts all rent and dissipates all surplus: b2 =1 ,e b (b2,θ2)=2and
e(b2,θ2)
b2 =1 . If µ ≥ τ













µ(µ − 2µτ + τ2)
2µ
.
Population Output Average Marginal
Mix (%) Eﬀort Eﬀort




b2 eb (b1,θ1) eb (b2,θ2)
10 90 - 1.00 - 1.00 - 2.00
20 80 - 1.00 - 1.00 - 2.00
30 70 0.00 1.00 - 1.00 0.60 2.00
40 60 0.17 0.92 0.77 0.92 0.94 1.84
50 50 0.26 0.86 0.86 0.86 1.12 1.72
60 40 0.32 0.82 0.92 0.82 1.23 1.63
70 30 0.35 0.78 0.95 0.78 1.30 1.56
80 20 0.38 0.75 0.98 0.75 1.35 1.50
90 10 0.39 0.72 0.99 0.72 1.38 1.45
100 0 0.40 - 1.00 - 1.40 -
Table 1: Output and Eﬀort
17Population Employment Partnership
mix (%) mix (%) mix (%)
Type θ1 Type θ2 Type θ1 Type θ2 Type θ1 Type θ2
10 90 - 100 - 100
20 80 - 100 - 100
30 70 30 70 0 100
40 60 40 60 8 92
50 50 50 50 20 80
60 40 60 40 34 66
70 30 70 30 49 51
80 20 80 20 65 35
90 10 90 10 82 18
1 0 001 0 001 0 00
Table 2: Employment Mix and Expected Partnership Mix.
Population Promotion Information Payoﬀ to
Mix (%) Probability Rent Principal
Type θ1 Type θ2 Type θ1 Type θ2 Type θ1 Type θ2 W
10 90 - 1
n -0 . 0 0 0 . 9 0 n
20 80 - 1
n -0 . 0 0 0 . 8 0 n
30 70 0 1.43
























n 0.00 0.23 0.42n
100 0 1
n − 0.00 - 0.40n
Table 3: Promotion Probabilities and Expected Payoﬀs. (Recall that n is the
size of the population of potential employees.)
18The properties of this example are illustrated in Tables 1 to 3, for τ =0 .6.
Table 1 shows how output, average eﬀort and marginal eﬀort vary as the popu-
lation mix changes. Table 2 shows how the population mix of types is reﬂected
in the employed population mix and in the population mix of partners (since
we have normalized the number of partners to 1, this should be interpreted as
the expected number of partners of each type). Table 3 shows how the promo-
tion probabilities, the information rents earned by each type, and payoﬀ to the
principal vary.
If the proportion of type θ1 agents in the population is below the critical
level of 30%, then the bottom type is completely excluded and only the top
type is employed. These agents are oﬀered a pure rat-race contract (Bardsley
[3]) with a zero wage, and an eﬀort level so high (the marginal eﬀort of 2 is well
above the eﬃcient level of 1) that the surplus is totally exhausted (the average
eﬀort is 1). As a consequence, all ex ante rents are dissipated.
As the proportion of type θ1 agents rises a threshold is crossed, and it sud-
denly becomes proﬁtable to employ all of the type θ1 agents as well as all of
the type θ2 agents. If even one type θ1 agent is employed it is necessary to pay
information rents to all of the type θ2 agents. Below the threshold there are not
enough potential type θ1 employees to warrant doing this. Above the threshold,
once the ﬁrst type θ1 a g e n ti se m p l o y e dt h e nt h e s er e n t sm u s tb ep a i di nf u l l ,
so there is no reason not to employ them all.
As the proportion of type θ1 agents rises beyond this critical level the popu-
lation mix is immediately reﬂected in the employed population, since everybody
is employed. However the number who make it through into partnership is quite
small. For example, if the population is evenly balanced, with 50% of each type,
only 20% of the partnership is of type θ1 while 80% are of type θ2. By way of
comparison, under complete information 47% would be of type θ1 and 53% of
type θ2. Even if the proportion of type θ2 agents fell to 10%, they would re-
main grossly over-represented in the partnership at around 18% (under complete
information this would only be 12%). We interpret this as a glass ceiling eﬀect.
The reason for this glass ceiling lies in the extraction of rent. As in any
standard adverse selection model, the principal extracts all rent from the bottom
type, but there are only a limited number of instruments available with which to
do so. In this model wages are immediately driven to 0 for everybody (Theorem
1). Rent cannot be extracted simply by making type θ1 work harder, as this
would not be incentive compatible: the high type would imitate the low type.
So the only way to extract rent involves a squeeze on the promotion probability.
It is interesting to note that type θ2 unambiguously beneﬁts from the adverse
selection eﬀe c ta n df r o mt h ep r e s e n c eo ft y p eθ1 agents in the population. This
is a model where the suppression of information, and the adverse selection that
then results, is Pareto improving for the agents relative to the (highly ineﬃcient)
complete information rat-race outcome.9 Under complete information all rents
are dissipated and all agents receive an ex ante expected utility of 0. Under
adverse selection some agents earn positive rents. As the proportion of type θ1
9See footnote 8 on the discussion of the eﬃciency criterion.
19agents increases, the type θ2 agents are unambiguously better oﬀ.T h e i re ﬀort
level decreases, and their promotion probability goes up. The value of being
promoted (the principal’s payoﬀ) does decrease, because the average quality of
the employment pool is declining, but this eﬀect is outweighed by the other two,
and the information rent increases.
5.2 Discrimination
We believe that this model throws light on questions of discrimination. Consider
a complete information environment where there are two observable types. One
is of lower productivity within the ﬁrm. For example, women may have higher
expected eﬀort costs due to child-bearing and child-rearing conventions; or mi-
nority groups may have language problems or they may have faced educational
discrimination. As in the Section 1, for clarity of exposition we will refer to the
two types as “women” and “men.” In a complete information environment we
would expect to see full employment with discriminatory contracts.
If discrimination is impossible, either by law or by social convention, then
these eﬀectively become hidden types — no contract can be conditioned on type.
Thus we model non-discriminatory behavior as the suppression of information.
We then see some interesting possibilities. In the ﬁrst place, there may be
segregated ﬁrms which employ only “men,” even though there are potentially
productive “women” in the population. So there is a threshold eﬀect. Until
the number of “women” in the population (in our example this would be the
number of “women” law graduates entering the employment market) reaches a
critical level, none are hired. Once the threshold is crossed, they are hired but
they face a promotion barrier. There is an obvious coordination problem that
may discourage any “women” from investing in legal qualiﬁcations.
Secondly, even if both types are employed we expect to see systematic dif-
ferences in promotion rates. Very few “women” are promoted to the top of
the organization. It should be emphasized that this is not a result of explicit
discrimination. In fact, the employment arrangements and promotion policies
are completely neutral and blind to the type of the agent; only the work that
they do and the output that they produce are relevant. The apparently dis-
criminatory outcomes are the result of self selection induced by the structure of
the contracts.
In the mixed ﬁrm the presence of “women” mitigates the high rat-race eﬀort
levels. As a consequence, “men” now earn positive information rents. Thus
in this model non-discrimination is welfare improving for the agents (relative
to the highly ineﬃcient complete information rat-race, which extracts all rents
from everyone). The “women” are no worse oﬀ, while “men” are better oﬀ.I t
is curious that it is the top type that beneﬁts from non-discriminatory hiring
and promotion.
205.3 Conclusion
In conclusion, the model is consistent with two quite diﬀerent types of ﬁrms: one
which hires only men, and one which hires both men and women indiscriminately
but which places promotion barriers in front of women. Employment in these
ﬁrms is characterized by the interaction of a “rat-race” for men and a “glass
ceiling” for women. The model also suggests that, because of the threshold eﬀect
and the coordination problem faced by women trying to break into the industry,
the single-type structure in which only men are hired may be quite persistent.
This would seem to be consistent with the historical facts (see Galanter and
Palay [11], Spurr [18]). The large law ﬁrm was for a long time an exclusively
male domain; now roughly equal numbers of men and women are hired, but
relatively few women reach partnership.
These eﬀects can be seen most clearly in a pure overlapping generations
ﬁrm, such as the traditional law partnership, but we conjecture that they will
operate, to a reduced degree, in any ﬁrm with an internal management ladder
and processes that place some weight on internal management succession.
21AP r o o f o f T h e o r e m 2
The conditions on the optimal contract may be summarized
n1σ1 min(ρ1,W)+n2σ2 min(ρ2,W)=W (11a)
n1σ1 (b1 − ρ1)+n2σ2 (b2 − ρ2) ≥ 0 (11b)
σ1ρ1 − σ1e(b1,θ1) ≥ 0 (11c)
σ2ρ2 − σ2e(b2,θ2) ≥ 0 (11d)
σ1ρ1 − σ1e(b1,θ1) ≥ σ2ρ2 − σ2e(b2,θ1) (11e)
σ2ρ2 − σ2e(b2,θ2) ≥ σ1ρ1 − σ1e(b1,θ2) (11f)
0 ≤ σi ≤ 1 (11g)
bi ≥ 0 (11h)
ρi ≥ 0 (11i)
We know in addition that either σ1 =1and ρ1 <W ,or σ2 =1and ρ2 <W ,
or both. We note that the result is clear if σ1 =0 , in which case the optimal
contract is given by b1 = ρ1 =0 ,b 2 = ρ2 = b, where b = e(b2,θ2), and
W = n2b2.
The result in the case that σ1 > 0 will be established by way of a number
of Lemmas in the remainder of this appendix. We now impose the assumption
that σ1 > 0, (which, by Lemma 3, implies that σ2 > 0 as well).
Lemma 5 The IR2 constraint (11d) is slack.
Proof. This follows from Lemma 3.
Lemma 6 The IC21 constraint (11f) binds.
Proof. Otherwise we could increase b2 without violating any of the con-
straints (11a) to (11i). This relaxes the budget constraint (11b), yielding a sur-
plus that could be distributed in an incentive compatible manner (see Lemma
2).
Lemma 7 A pooling contract can never be optimal. In fact, any contract with
σ1 = σ2,b 1 = b2 and ρ1 = ρ2 cannot be optimal.
Proof. In any pooling contract we must have σ1 = σ2 =1 , ρ1 = ρ2 <W ,
b1 = b2 and W = n1ρ1 + n2ρ2. We will not at this stage impose all these
constraints.
Let us look for an optimal contract under the assumptions σ1 = σ2 =1 ,
ρ1 <W ,ρ2 <W .By Theorem 1, w1 = w2 =0and πi < 1 for each i. It will be
suﬃcient to show that in any such contract b1 6= b2. The Lagrangean is
L =( 1− α)(n1ρ1 + n2ρ2)+α(n1b1 + n2b2)
+ β (ρ1 − e(b1,θ1))
+ δ1 (ρ1 − e(b1,θ1) − ρ2 + e(b2,θ1))
+ δ2 (ρ2 − e(b2,θ2) − ρ1 + e(b1,θ2)),
22yielding ﬁrst order conditions
(1 − α)n1 + β + δ1 − δ2 =0
(1 − α)n2 − δ1 + δ2 =0
αn1 − (β + δ1)eb (b1,θ1)+δ2eb (b1,θ2)=0
αn2 + δ1eb (b2,θ1) − δ2eb (b2,θ2)=0 .
The multipliers α, β, δ1 and δ2 are non-negative.
Let us now impose the assumption b1 = b2 = b. The IC constraints (11e),
(11f) imply that ρ1 = ρ2 = ρ, and the budget constraint (11b) implies that
ρ = b. The ﬁrst order conditions become
(1 − α)n1 + β + δ1 − δ2 =0 (12a)
(1 − α)n2 − δ1 + δ2 =0 (12b)
αn1 − (β + δ1)eb (b,θ1)+δ2eb (b,θ2)=0 (12c)
αn2 + δ1eb (b,θ1) − δ2eb (b,θ2)=0 . (12d)
Adding these together in pairs,
β =( α − 1)n
αn = βeb (b,θ1).




eb (b,θ1) − 1
β =
n
eb (b,θ1) − 1
.
Substituting in (12b) and (12d),
δ2 − δ1 =
n2
eb (b,θ1) − 1
δ2eb (b,θ2) − δ1eb (b,θ1)=
n2eb (b,θ1)








eb (b,θ1) − 1
= δ2 − δ1 > 0.
Thus δ2e(b,θ2)=δ2e(b,θ1). But δ2 6=0 , since δ1 ≥ 0, so e(b,θ2)=e(b,θ1),
which implies that b =0 . This is a contradiction, as it would imply that W =0 .
Lemma 8 The IC12 constraint (11e) does not bind.
23Proof. We label the types θi and θj in such a way that bi ≤ bj. If there
is more than one contract that satisﬁes (11a) to (11i) and that yields the same
payoﬀ to the principal, we assume that a contract has been chosen such that bj
is minimal.
Let us assume that the constraints IC12 and IC21 both bind. The constraints









σiγ (bi)=σjγ (bj), (15)
where for convenience we write
h(b)=e(b,θ1)
γ (b)=e(b,θ1) − e(b,θ2).
These are respectively the eﬀort cost of type θ1 and the cost advantage of
type θ2 over type θ1. The sorting condition (3a) implies that γ (b) is strictly
increasing. The constant ∆ ≥ 0 measures the information rent of type θ1; if the
IR1 constraint binds then ∆ =0 , but at this stage we do not know whether
this is so. The budget constraint (11b) becomes:
niσi (bi − h(bi)) + njσj (bj − h(bj)) ≥ n∆, (16)
where n = ni + nj.
We may assume that bi <b j, for if bi = bj then, by (13) to (15), we have
σi = σj and ρi = ρj, which is excluded by Lemma 7.
Since γ (b) is strictly increasing, we note, from (15), that σi > σj. So we
know by Lemma 4 that in fact σi =1and σj < 1. It then follows, from (13)
and (14),t h a tρi < ρj. Also note that, by Theorem 1, σi =1implies ρi <W.
To show that the above cannot be optimal, we now consider the following
contract. For type θi the contract (σi,b i,ρi) is unchanged. For type θj we







The constant ∆ is held ﬁxed. We set




1−njσ(b) if ρ(b) >W ,
niσih(bi)+njσ(b)h(b)+n∆ if ρ(b) ≤ W.
24These are respectively the budget surplus and the payoﬀ to the principal under
the modiﬁed contract.
Note that σ(b) is decreasing in b by deﬁnition; it follows that ρ(b) is increas-
ing in b. We claim that for b<b j and suﬃciently close to bj this new contract
meets all the constraints but yields an equal or higher payoﬀ to the principal.
It is clear by deﬁnition that the constraints IR1,I C 12 and IC21 are met. We
know that the IR2 constraint is strictly slack, so by continuity it is satisﬁed for
b close to bj. We now consider two cases.
Case 1: ρj >W
We will show that the budget surplus strictly improves under the new con-
tract, and the principal’s share improves weakly. By redistributing some of this
surplus (as in the proof of Lemma 2) the principal can be made better oﬀ.
To show that the budget constraint is satisﬁed if b<b j it is suﬃcient to
show that B (b) is a decreasing function of b. Apart from a constant term, B (b)
is just






where A = σi (e(bi,θ1) − e(bi,θ2)) is a positive constant that does not depend
on b. Thus it is suﬃcient to check that
e(b,θ1)−b
e(b,θ1)−e(b,θ2) is increasing in b. But this
is Assumption 3, condition (3c).
We must also show that W (b) is decreasing in b. We know that ρi <W
(Theorem 1). Since ρ(b) is increasing in b,f o rb smaller than but close to bj, we




Then W (b) is decreasing in b, since σ(b) is decreasing in b.
Case 2: ρj ≤ W
First note, by Assumption 2, condition (2a), and by Assumption 3, condi-
tions (3a) and (3b),t h a tγ (0) = 0, γ0 (b) > 0, and γ00 (b) ≥ 0. Thus 0=γ (0) ≥
γ (b)−bγ0 (b), which implies that b
γ(b) is weakly decreasing in b. Thus the total
surplus
B (b)+W (b)=niσibi + njσ (b)b
= niσibi + njσjγ (bj)
b
γ (b)
is weakly decreasing in b. As b is reduced a little below bj the total surplus
B (b)+W (b) will not decrease, and it may increase.
25It is not immediately clear that such a change is beneﬁcial to the principal,
since W (b) could decrease even if B (b)+W (b) increases. However, ρi <W
and ρ(b) < ρj ≤ W so by Remark 2 the principal can redesign the contract
to appropriate fully any marginal increase in the budget surplus B (b). After
appropriating this surplus the principal is no worse oﬀ, and may be better oﬀ,
but the output level of the high output (type θj) agents has been reduced. This
contradicts the minimality of bj.
Corollary 2 The constraint IR1 binds.
Proof. We have shown that the constraints IR2 constraint (11d) and the
IC12 constraint (11e) do not bind. If IR1 does not bind then we can increase
b1, holding all other parameters of the contract ﬁxed, without violating any
incentive compatibility or individual rationality constraints. But this relaxes
the budget constraint, yielding a surplus that can be distributed as in Lemma
2.
B Proof of Theorem 3(1)
The following lemma shows that, in an economy with an arbitrary number I ≥ 1
of agent types, an optimal contract under complete information is characterized
by full employment. Result (1) of Theorem 3 then follows.
It is convenient to return to the original Problem (P) with the constraints
given by (1a)-(1h).
Lemma 9 (full employment) In the absence of incentive constraints, all agents
are employed: σi =1of all i.
Proof. Consider Problem (P) without the constraints (1c). It is clear that
the individual rationality constraints (1b) bind under an optimal contract, for
otherwise the agents could be required to work harder, and the principal’s payoﬀ
W could be increased. We now show that in an optimal contract, if σi > 0,
then σi =1 ,f o ra l li ≤ I. Suppose not, i.e., there is type θi which is oﬀered a
contract (σi,b i,w i,πi) with 0 < σi < 1. Now consider an alternative contract, in
which all other types’ contracts do not change, and type θi is oﬀered a modiﬁed
contract (˜ σi,˜ bi, ˜ wi, ˜ πi),w i t h˜ σi =1 , ˜ bi = σibi, ˜ wi = σiwi,a n d˜ πi = σiπi. Since,
by Lemma 2, the budget constraint (1a) was binding before the modiﬁcation,
we observe that the payoﬀ W to the principal remains unchanged under the
modiﬁed contract; all feasibility constraints and the stationarity constraint (1h)
also hold. Checking the individual rationality constraint:
˜ σi
³




= σi (wi + πiW)−e(σibi,θi) > σi (wi + πiW − e(bi,θi)),
where the inequality follows from the convexity of eﬀort assumption (2c). This
shows that the IRi constraint is slack and hence this contract can be improved
upon in a feasible manner. Thus, the original contract could not be optimal.
26It is left to show that in an optimal contract σi > 0 for all i. Suppose
not, that is, σi =0for some type θi. This type is potentially productive
(Assumption 4). Consider a new contract in which this type works productively
and is compensated solely through a wage wi = e(bi,θi); the surplus goes to
the principal. This relaxes the individual rationality constraint for the other
types, so the new contract is feasible and it is better for the principal.
C Proof of Theorem 4(1)
The result follows from the following two lemmas:
Lemma 10 (Full employment at the top) In an optimal contract under adverse
selection, σ2 =1 .
Proof. Consider the original Problem (P) with the constraints given by
(1a)-(1h). Let I =2 . We know, from Theorem 2, that IR1, IC21 bind, and
IR2, IC12 are strictly slack. If σ1 =0under an optimal contract, then we
are in the one-type world, and the result follows trivially. Now suppose that
σ1 > 0,a n dσ2 < 1. To prove that this contract cannot be optimal, we show
that we can improve on the principal’s payoﬀ by substituting a small number
of type θ1 agents by type θ2 agents, without violating any of the constraints.
Pick ∆σ > 0 small, with ∆σ ≤ min{σ1, n2
n1(1− σ2)}, and consider the following
modiﬁed contract: ˜ σ1 = σ1 − ∆σ, ˜ σ2 = σ2 + n1
n2∆σ, (˜ b1, ˜ w1, ˜ π1)=( b1,w 1,π1),
and (˜ b2, ˜ w2, ˜ π2)=α(b2,w 2,π2)+( 1− α)(b1,w 1,π1),w h e r eα ≡ σ2n2
σ2n2+∆σn1.I t
is easy to check (as in the proof of Lemma 9) that principal’s payoﬀ W remains
the same as in the original contract, and the budget constraint, all feasibility
constraints and the stationarity constraint still hold. Next notice that, since
the eﬀort function is convex and decreasing in type, this contract increases the
utility of type θ2 agents:
˜ σ2(˜ w2 +˜ π2W − e(˜ b2;θ2)) >
> ˜ σ2(α
σ2(w2 + π2W − e(b2;θ2))
σ2
+( 1− α)
σ1(w1 + π1W − e(b1;θ1))
σ1
)=
= σ2(w2 + π2W − e(b2;θ2)) +
∆σn1
σ1n2
σ1(w1 + π1W − e(b1;θ1)) >
> σ2(w2 + π2W − e(b2;θ2))
The utility of type θ1 agents is unchanged. Hence IC21 is now slack, and IR1,
IR2 still hold. The type θ2 contract becomes more attractive to type θ1 after the
modiﬁcation, but since IC12 was slack under the original contract, by continuity
it will still hold under the modiﬁed contract for ∆σ small enough. Since IC21
is now slack, this contract can be further improved upon to increase W (as in
the proofs of lemma 6). Thus the original contract could not be optimal.
Lemma 11 In an optimal contract under adverse selection, either σ1 =1or
σ1 =0 .
27Proof. Consider the Problem (P00), with the constraints given by (8a) to
(8g). By Theorem 2, we know that IR1, IC21 bind. We can use these binding






where γ (b) ≡ e(b,θ1) − e(b,θ2). We note that, by assumptions (3a) and (3b),
γ(b) is positive for b>0, increasing and convex.
By Lemma 10, σ2 =1 , and hence, by Theorem 1, ρ2 <W .T h u s w e c a n
rewrite the principal’s problem as to maximize W subject to:
Assume that 0 < σ1 < 1. By Remark 1 we have b1 > 0, b2 > 0.
First consider the case ρ1 ≤ W, which implies that min(e(b1,θ1),W)=






where γ (b) is as deﬁned above. Note that the virtual eﬀort curves satisfy all of
the Assumptions 2 made on the eﬀort curves.
The problem’s constraints are
n1σ1ε1 (b1)+n2ε2 (b2)=W (17a)
n1σ1 (b1 − ε1 (b1)) + n2 (b2 − ε2 (b2)) ≥ 0 (17b)
0 ≤ σ1 ≤ 1 (17c)
bi ≥ 0. (17d)
By our supposition, constraints (17c) and (17d) do not bind. The Lagrangean
is
L = n1σ1ε1 (b1)+n2ε2 (b2)
+ β (n1σ1b1 + n2b2 − n1σ1ε1 (b1) − n2ε2 (b2))
=( 1− β)(n1σ1ε1 (b1)+n2ε2 (b2)) + β (n1σ1b1 + n2b2)
with β ≥ 0. Then
Lb1 =( 1− β)n1σ1ε0
1 (b1)+βn1σ1 =0
Lσ1 =( 1− β)n1ε1 (b1)+βn1b1 =0 .
It is clear that β 6=0 ,1. So b1ε0
1 (b1)=ε1 (b1), or marginal virtual cost equals
average virtual cost. But this is impossible if b1 > 0, given the virtual eﬀort
function is increasing, convex and ε1 (0) = 0.
28Now consider the case ρ1 >W ,which implies that W = n1σ1W +n2ρ2. The
Lagrangean may be written
L = W
+ α(W − n1σ1W − n2σ1γ(b1) − n2e(b2,θ2))
+ β (n1σ1b1 + n2b2 − n1σ1e(b1,θ1) − n2σ1γ(b1) − n2e(b2,θ2))
with β ≥ 0. Then
LW =1+α(1 − n1σ1)=0 (18)
Lb1 = βn1σ1 (1 − eb (b1,θ1)) − (α + β)n2σ1γ0(b1)=0 (19)
Lb2 = n2 (β − (α + β)eb (b2,θ2)) = 0 (20)
Lσ1 = n1 (β (b1 − e(b1,θ1)) − αW) − (α + β)n2γ(b1)=0 (21)
We note ﬁrst that, from (18), α 6=0and hence, from (20), β 6=0 . Further,
from (20), we obtain that since β > 0, then (α+β) > 0.N e x tw es i g nα.S i n c e
W = n1σ1W+n2ρ2, we have W (1 − n1σ1)=n2σ1γ(b1)+n2e(b2,θ2). Multiply-
ing by α and using (18), −W = α(n2σ1γ(b1)+n2e(b2,θ2)), so α < 0. Now we
know that Lb1 =0and, by assumption, Lσ1 =0 ,s o 1
n1βσ1b1 (b1Lb1 − σ1Lσ1)=








βb1 =0 .T h u sf0 (b1) <
f(b1)
b1 .B u tf (0) = 0 and f is strictly convex,
so f0 (b) >
f(b)
b for b>0, which provides us with a contradiction.
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